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The aim of this work is to present in a systematic way elements around the debate on the 
persistence of a central bank arrangement, currency boards or the Dollarization option. In some 
special circumstances, both later arrangements could be desirable. They are not a universal 
panacea in the way to stabilization and sound growth. The case of Argentina in recent decades is 




Comparing to advanced economies, Latin American inflation in Post World War II to date, was 
100 times more volatile, and GDP growth twice more volatile, with more frequent and extreme 
recessions. A great deal of that volatility was caused by unstable policies. Changes in money 
supply had been 20 times more volatile than advanced countries, contributing to a history of rapid 
inflation. Between 1970 through 1998, annual inflation measured by CPI averaged 158% in 
Argentina, 143% in Brazil, 51% in Chile, 34% in Mexico, 108% in Peru and 25% in Venezuela. 
At the same time, the average in the US was 5% per year. A great part of Latin America is “de 
facto” Dollarized. Then, is not strange in that context that some countries had implemented 
recently Currency Boards (Argentina), or directly Dollarized (Equator and El Salvador). In some 
other countries, these options of Currency Board or Dollarization are in the discussion of 
instability and growth. 
The aim of this work is to present in a systematic way elements around the debate on the 
persistence of a central bank arrangement, currency boards or the Dollarization option. In some 
special circumstances, both later arrangements could be desirable. Nevertheless, they are not a 
universal panacea in the way to stabilization and sound growth. The case of Argentina in recent 
decades is analyzed. There, the currency board could be an intermediate step to full Dollarization.  




A Currency Board is a monetary authority that issues notes and coins convertible to a foreign 
currency or good into a fixed value and on demand (Schuler 1998). Foreign currency or metals 
like gold or plate, backed fiduciary currency, which act as a voucher representative of the backing 
asset. There had been Currency Boards in around 70 countries in the last 150 years. The idea 
surged in the United Kingdom in the first 1800s, between groups of economists known as the 
Currency School. They had ample political influence and the 1844 Charter Bank Act they 
inspired, was conceived to convert the Bank of England in a Currency Board. The act did not 
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establish reserve requirements on deposits, and as a result, instead of converting Bank of England 
in a Currency Board, it was transformed in a Central Bank. Because the United Kingdom was the 
most advanced country at the time, its example was imitated for other countries (Schuler, 1998). 
In the 1950s, around 50 countries or territories had at the same time Currency Boards. From 
historic observation, it yields those countries with Currency Boards enjoyed stability and in 
general, a good macroeconomic performance (Schuler, 1992). 
Currency Boards have no discretion in monetary policy. Its main characteristics are: 
1) Convertibility at a fixed rate. Back assets cover monetary base, but no bank money. There is 
no place to act as a lender of last resort to the commercial banks. 
2) It needs reserves (in some proportion) to back issued currency. A fraction is maintained in an 
extremely liquid form, to attend conversion claims. 
3) Notes and coins issues yield segniorage to issuer. Net income perceived by Currency Board 
depends on interest on backing assets. And the political value “national currency” is 
maintained. It is not the case when local currency is entirely substituted. 
4) With low trade barriers, local tradable prices are in line with rest of the world goods. Non-
tradable could diverge. With capital account openness and in absence of political risk, interest 
rates should be approximately the same locally than in the rest of the world. 
5) By design, Currency Boards have no discretionary power to exert active monetary policy 
(Schuler, 1992). 
A Currency Board is not a Central Bank. The most important difference is that the former 
maintain a fixed proportion of backing reserves in external assets, not the case in the latter. 
Currency Boards imply to peg exchange rates forever. A lender of last resort could be thinking 
only from deposit insurance or another coverage device.  
It had been a feature of Currency Boards, the allowance to enter in local banking market awarded 
to foreign banks. Property of banks by a foreign matrix is another way to ensure coverage in 
absence of a lender of last resort.  
Public budgets in Currency Boards countries had tended to be balanced or run superavits, in 
average. The possibility of using monetary policy to fiscal goals is very limited in a Currency 
Board agreement. 
In the first times of Currency Boards, the alternative was competitive issuing of notes by 
commercial banks. The rationale to monopolize issuing in a Currency Board came from the 
practice of the United Kingdom (although Swedish Central Bank is the oldest). State monopoly 
of money issuing was established in the United Kingdom in the Charter Bank Act from 1844. 
Banks used to compete against each other; issuing money as well as currently they competes in 
the traveler check market (Schuler, 1992). Bank of England turned to be a Central Bank, since 
1844, but limited in money issuing by the presence of Gold Standard. The same occurred with 
German Central Bank, and another nations cases, following British criteria. Federal Reserve of 
the United States was established in 1913, following some panics and financial crashes. Bank of 
England adopted lender of last resort criteria in 1890, with Baring’s crack, ironically originated in 
non-performance credits accorded to Argentina, at the time in a severe economic crisis that led 
this country to its first Currency Board experience.  
Currency Boards arrangements started and spread into British colonies. Mauritius and New 
Zealand were the first experiences, starting in 1849 and 1850 respectively. 
In the 1980s, when Currency Boards returned, they were not introduced to facilitate monetary 
relationships between colonies and its metropolis. Instead, they were used to reach a set of 
specific economic defies, like to facilitate transition of former state planned economies (Estonia 
and Lithuania), fight hyperinflation (Argentina and Bulgaria), to restore confidence in a political 
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crisis and a bank panic (Hong Kong), or to provide an stable post war institutional environment 
(Bosnia) (Gulde, Kahkonen y Keller, 2000). 
Most famous Currency Board is Hong Kong’s. HK Dollar is pegged to US Dollar, to a rate HK$ 
7,80 = US$ 1. Chinese government had promised to retain Hong Kong economic system up to 50 
years from British devolution of the territory to China, on July 1st, 1997. Hong Kong currency 
board is not completely orthodox: HK Monetary Authority had gained functions, resembling a 
Central Bank, In August 1998, it bought shares in local Stock Exchange, to support prices. The 
regime rests on tradition, more than in a written law. It does not exist a specific reserve 
requirement to maintain nor is specified its composition (Schuler, 1998). 
Argentina introduced a Currency Board on April 1st, 1991 ($ 1 = US$ 1). Estonia did the same on 
20th June 1991 (8 Kroons = DM 1). Lithuania on April 1st, 1994 (4 Litai = US$ 1). Bulgaria 
adopted a similar regime on July 1st, 1997 (1000 Leva = DM 1). Bosnia, as part of peace accords, 
implemented its Currency Board on August 1st, 1997. Brunei has the oldest existing system, 
using Singapore Dollar as reserve currency. Monetary Authority is obliged to hold 70% of local 
currency value, in backing reserves. Djibouti has a Currency Board scheme with 100% backing.    
Estonian, Lithuanian and Bulgarian experiences had been quite favorable. Inflation had 
converged to single digits in each country, and Estonia and Lithuania enjoyed a strong economic 
growth (Gulde, Kahkonen y Keller, 2000). Table 1 shows existing Currency Boards and its main 
characteristics. 
There are quasi-Currency Boards in Singapore, Latvia and 14 African countries using CFA Franc 
(Associate French Community). Singapore holds a quasi-Currency Board since 1973, but with 
flexible exchange rates. It holds 100% reserves. The Bank of Latvia has pegged its currency to 
SDR, and holds 100% of reserves in foreign currency, but it has no formal commitment of 
convertibility for its domestic currency. CFA Franc holds a pegged exchange rate with French 
Franc. It had 50% devaluation in 1994, following a long time of stability. Mandatory backing is 
only of 20% reserves.  
 
III-Theoretical Arguments in the Discussion 
 
There is a debate on the exchange regime election. To Less Developed Countries, especially 
unstable ones, scholars, businessmen and politicians are recommending Currency Boards, or 
Dollarization. Each alternative have costs and benefits, in its abstract presentation and as the 
concrete experience is applied. For some countries, sacrificing its monetary policy independence 
to diminish transaction costs associated to trade and capital flows could be very expensive. Other 
countries have had very poor performance in its monetary management, linked to fiscal fragility 
and political pressures to use Central Bank in channeling subsidies. In this countries is more 
strongly recommended more rigid exchange rates adoption, although some authors had suggested 
even Canada’s Dollarization. 
Beyond the choosing of exchange regime, the currency to be linked to is another concern that 
implies costs and benefits: there are natural partners. Literature on optimal currency zones, 
starting with Mundell in the 1960s, focuses in balancing positive and negative consequences and 
recognizes factors to be aware on, in the choosing of a currency link: 
1) Openness of the economy. 
2) Commercial integration degree between partners. 
3) Factor mobility between partners. 
4) Symmetry of shocks between both economies. 
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The debate had been enriched with the recent European experience and the rebirth of Currency 
Boards. Stein et al (1999) take in account of new elements, beyond traditional arguments around 
the idea of optimal currency zones: 
1) Benefits in terms of credibility. 
2) Initial conditions in currency substitution, including the degree of indebtedness in foreign 
exchange. 
A country that Dollarize, has an implicit optimal currency zone criteria, in relation to the United 
States. Availability of adjustment mechanisms (like prices and wages flexibility, geographical 
and sector labor mobility, capital flows and fiscal transfers), are part of the issues to take in 
account, in order to determine when a country is to join on, to an optimal monetary zone (Stein, 
1999). Currency Board is the more rigid way to preserve the value of proper currency, and 
Dollarization is an extreme form of pegged exchange rates. They have important advantages: 
1) They allow to reduce exchange risk, in relation to United States or other Dollarized countries, 
that otherwise threaten trade and investment flows. Transaction costs into the area diminish. 
2) They provide a nominal anchor to monetary policy (discretion is costly in inflation rate). 
The drawbacks are as follows: 
1) Monetary policy independence is lost (discretion could be advantageous to solve a crisis or to 
reach more autonomy). 
2) Credibility is not automatic, depending on a strong commitment with parity, and on a link 
with a good reputation currency. 
Currency Boards accomplish strongly with pegged exchange rates advantages, but its drawbacks 
are more pronounced, in the sense that the exit option is more restricted than in the case of a 
classic peg. 
Dollarization has the same pros and cons that pegged exchange rates, and Currency Boards, but 
magnified: 
1) The exchange rate risk is totally avoided (with respect to US Dollar). 
2) Transaction costs associated to finance and trade are reduced. 
3) Maximum credibility benefits are achieved: it implies a very strong commitment with a very 
confidence currency. 
4) Monetary independence is completely lost. 
5) It could need painful deflationary adjustments against shocks. If available, devaluation is a 
less hard alternative. 
6) Segniorage is lost, and an “intangible asset”, with a strong value in certain countries 
(Monetary Sovereignty) is lost. 
There are countries where advantages or drawbacks of Dollarization are more significant. 
Benefits will be bigger, the bigger is initial local currency volatility, exchange transaction costs 
and commercial integration to the United States or another Dollarized countries (Stein et al 
1999). Dollarization reduces inflation volatility, interest rate volatility, and real exchange rate 
volatility, yielding more financial deepening. Thus, have more to gain countries with high and 
variable inflation, higher exchange rate and interest rate volatility and less developed financial 
systems. Openness of the economy gains importance at the time to decide currency substitution. 
Devaluation in open economies is less effective to affect GDP and employment, but as tradable 
increases its weight in local index price, devaluation goes more directly to local prices. In very 
open economies, a nominal devaluation only yields real effects in the very short run, and at 
important cost in inflation rate growth. 
Uncertainty and risk linked to trade and financial flows outside currency area could be cover with 
exchange rate derivatives. 
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An independent monetary policy allows to isolate local interest rates against the rest of the world, 
and to use monetary policy as a countercyclical tool. Moreover, deflationary adjustment could be 
avoided in very critical situations, combining it with devaluation. The monetary policy loss will 
be less severe if country that Dollarizes has an economic cycle highly correlated with that of the 
United States, an important degree of wage flexibility, high labor mobility with the United States, 
a transfer system between the two countries (for example, immigrants transfers to its relatives), 
and openness of the economy. The latter imply per se a little degree of effectiveness of monetary 
policy and costly devaluation in terms of inflation rate.  
If liabilities in the economy are very Dollarized, devaluation option implies very important costs 
(Calvo, 1999). Liabilities Dollarization can come from the impossibility of generate long run 
liability instruments in local currency, because of a lack of credibility. In those economies, 
devaluation lost one of its capacities: liability deflation (Stein et al 1999). Public debt is 
Dollarized too, when access to medium and long run credit in domestic currency is not available. 
The little group of Latin American countries having a significant domestic currency denominated 
public debt, issue only short term issued securities. Debtors in foreign exchange, private or 
public, turn unbalanced in they currency and turn more fragile to real exchange rate variation, in 
high interest rate and exchange rate volatility context. Credit risk increases in consequence, and 
that element impacts in bank spreads. Calvo (1999), bringing an old Fisher contribution, points 
out that deflation and its effect on debts is one cause of recessions turning depressions. Calvo 
(1999) sees it as the major treat to economies adopting Dollarization. Nominal devaluation, when 
available, turns ex post contingent a credit contract, been not contingent at all ex ante. 
Devaluation and deflationary adjustments have asymmetric effects, when part of corporate assets 
are financing by liabilities denominated in local currencies. Results are the opposite when debts 
are Dollarized. Under Dollarization, inflation does not liquate debts. Velocities are different too: 
in a deflationary adjustment, the effect of corporate balance sheets is slower; under devaluation is 
immediate. 
Exchange rate flexibility permits to isolate a country from external interest rate movements. 
Monetary policy could be used, in this context, to manage aggregate demand: exchange rate can 
reach external equilibrium and monetary policy, full employment. Last, but not least, it allows to 
set internal price level, avoiding costly deflationary adjustments. Adopting the Dollar implies 
adopting monetary policy of the United States. It yields better results if booms and recessions of 
Dollarizing country tend to occur at the same time that them in the United States. If Central Bank 
lost its prerogative of issuing money; it cannot avoid a severe deflationary adjustment. 
Wage rigidity turns adjustment in recession periods slower and costly, and could generate long 
time with high unemployment. Although regulatory rigidity in the labor market turn difficult the 
adjustments in asymmetric shocks environment (discretion is desirable in that case); the higher 
indexation degree, generally present in unstable economies, reduces benefits and increases costs 
of using that discretion. 
Dollarization adopts three ways: non-official or de facto, semi-official and official, or de jure. 
Non-official Dollarization take place when people hold and use domestically foreign currency 
even it has not legal status. In the semi-official case, Dollar is of common use in certain scopes or 
Dollar denominated deposits are allowed. Official Dollarization is the last stage, turning Dollar 
legal tender. Researchers of the FED estimated in 1996 that between 55 to 70% of issued Dollars 
are in hands of foreigners (Schuler, 1999). Nevertheless, 75% of new Dollar notes are demanded 
outside the US (Stein, 1999). A study done by the Bundesbank a year ago, estimated that 
foreigners owned 40% of DM notes (Schuler, 1999). In Latin America, the Caribbean and Russia, 
US Dollar is the chosen reserve currency. The DM does the same in the Balkans and Baltic states.  
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More than a dozen countries have semi-official Dollarization or official bi-monetary systems. 
There foreign money is legal tender and even it can dominate bank deposits, but plays a 
secondary role with respect to domestic currency in small transactions. These countries hold a 
Central Bank or a Currency Board, and they do some monetary policy. 
Under official Dollarization, foreign currency has exclusive or predominant legal tender. If local 
currency already exists, it is restricted to a secondary role, like low value coins. Panama, for 
example, issues coins of the Balboa, but not notes. An officially Dollarized country resigns an 
independent monetary policy, and imports the monetary policy in use in the issuer of the adopted 
currency.  
A cost of currency substitution is lost segniorage, paid now to the issuer of the foreign currency 
in use. Segniorage could be measured in stock or flow terms. Net (stock) segniorage, is the 
difference between the cost of introducing money in circulation, and the value of goods to be 
purchased with that money. A one Dollar note has a production cost of approximately 3 cents 
(Schuler, 1999), but US government could use it to buy goods for a value of US$ 1. If the note 
will be in circulation for all the eternity, net segniorage will be 97 cents. In reality, it is less, 
because in 18 months on average, the note has to be replaced. Another way to think on 
segniorage is as an income flow along the time. Who retain notes, lends to the issuer without 
interests. In this approach, gross segniorage is average money base times an inflation index in a 
given period.  
To reduce segniorage losses as an obstacle through official Dollarization, the United States can 
consider the possibility of share increases in segniorage with countries that declare Dollar as legal 
tender. A risk to the US is to turn more complicated monetary policy management. With respect 
to the possibility that the United States share segniorage with third countries that adopted its 
currency, there is a precedent in the Rand area (South Africa shared segniorage with Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland, before this country adopted its own currency, the Lilangeni) (Berg y 
Borensztein, 2000). 
The risk of devaluation or revaluation of a linked currency, will almost disappeared to Americans 
in its relations with countries officially Dollarized (in that sense, there are for the United States 
the same gains in terms of certainty in those markets, than in countries that Dollarize with respect 
to the United States). Costs of money conversion will disappear. The United States has to win if 
Dollarization improves economies of the countries that are clients of its exports. 
There is a cost to loose a local Central Bank as a lender of last resort. There are substitutes, like 
contingent credit lines of external banks, as Argentina arranged recently. Agencies of foreign 
banks can also offer credit directly to domestic banks, without involving the government, as in 
Panama. 
Official Dollarization erases transaction costs with another countries into the currency-unifying 
zone. Also transaction costs with another monies are reduced, because triangulation is avoided. 
Bigger transactions, between, for instance, Mexican Peso and Japanese Yen do occur in two 
steps: Peso-Dollar and Dollar-Yen. Using Dollar in Mexico, in its transaction with Japan a step 
will be eliminated. 
Without the existence of a domestic currency, banks could hold fewer reserves, reducing its costs 
for doing business. The existence of domestic money implies to banks, the need of isolate its 
local currency portfolios from Dollar portfolios. 
An officially Dollarized country ensures itself an inflation rate closed to American, with low 
level and relatively stable, interest rates. 
No having domestic currency to defend, official Dollarization eliminates balance of payment 
crisis, and the need of exchange rate controls. Eliminating the power of the government to create 
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inflation, official Dollarization stimulates budgetary discipline. It does not mean that budget will 
be balanced forever: Panama has had big sized deficits (Schuler, 1999). 
Dollarization has more benefits when Dollarizing country has a history of poor monetary 
performance that curtails local currency credibility. Lack of credibility obliges debtors in those 
economies to pay high interest rates, and reduces economic growth. 
In a country where no-official Dollarization is already extended, segniorage derived from its own 
currency is of little scope. That implies fewer costs for Dollarize. 
According to Zarazaga (1995), the debate on Currency Boards and Dollarization is no more then 
the old controversy “Rules against Discretion”. Rules are inherently time inconsistent: 
governments tend to abandon them. Zarazaga (1995) considers that conceptions of supporters of 
Currency Boards or Dollarization are naive. Governments ever will abandon rules, in case of 
need. For politicians, abandoned rules were the better solution in the past, but could not be 
optimal under present circumstances. Currency Boards are a monetary policy rule, and 
Dollarization its extreme case. They do not resolve time inconsistency because they cannot 
provide a rapid and low cost form to correct economic problems in economies like Mexican or 
Argentinean with prolonged time inconsistency, stories. Rules in that countries are costly, 
because credibility of policies depends more on past behavior in honoring commitments, than in 
current institutional arrangements. Economic discipline recognizes superiority of contingent 
rules, to strict rules and discretion, but in these kinds of countries should be limited the use of 
contingent rules. Currency Boards are no contingent rules, but not the unique contingent rules 
(Zarazaga, 1995). Reputation caring, plays a more important role than institutions in resolving 
time inconsistency, and in providing government with incentives to adhere to policy rules, 
although in the short run could be temptations to deviate. In the other hand, credibility will be 
higher in countries with a tradition of policy rules respect, than in countries with repudiation 
stories. Formal institutions or laws could not remove skepticism around the credibility of 
government commitments in countries that used to violate them. Nevertheless, should be take in 
account that the option to Dollarize is a resource to whom lacks reputation, and do not get some 
time to construct it, may be because they are being in the middle of hyperinflation, or with a hard 
financial crisis. 
Eichengreen (2000), argues that the timing of Dollarization cares. Implicit in the debate there are 
two different ways to see the timing of Dollarization, with other reforms, having very different 
implications on the discounted net present value of costs and benefits associated. One approach is 
to see Dollarization as the last step of a complete set of reforms. Banking system should be 
strengthening, because of the lack of a lender of last resort. Public budget should be balanced, 
and public debt structured to face future issues without jeopardy government ability to indebted. 
Contingent credit arrangements could be provide. Labor market should be reorganized, because 
of the lack of the devaluation option. And the economy should aligned its cycles with those of the 
United States, may be through a Free Trade Agreement. At this moment, circumstances could be 
mature to Dollarize without trauma (With Latin American sense of humor: “in that case, why to 
Dollarize?). An alternative is do not waiting for the reforms, because the Dollarization itself will 
produce necessary changes for the well functioning of the system. The exit of the devaluation 
option will induce needed reforms in the labor market, because its actors will recognize the need 
of wage flexibility to face shocks. Dollarization will strengthen financial system because of the 
elimination of differences in assets and liabilities in different monies. Fiscal balance will 
improve, because less public debt interests. Dollarization may eliminate money risk, so public 
debt could be issued to longer terms. Commercial credit could be arranged to attend government 
compromises as lender of last resort on a crisis. And finally, it will lead to an economic cycles 
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co-ordination with the United States, because of the convergence of interest rates to those of that 
country. 
In Europe, there was a similar controversy, when the discussion around monetary union took 
place (Eichengreen, 2000). Germans argued that economic policies and performance should 
converge before monetary union (“Coronation Theory”). French officers answer that only 
pegging exchange rates, macroeconomic and institutional convergence will be achieved (“Nike 
Approach”, because of the slogan “Just Do It”). First criteria won the discussion (Eichengreen, 
2000).  
The context of the discussion is not the same than in Latin America, when unilateral 
Dollarization is studied (Equator and El Salvador, did it; in Argentina it was announced as a 
possibility, in opportunity of Brazilian devaluation at the beginning of the year 2000). European 
Monetary Union was a result of an agreement, and although Bundesbank model was took as a 
paradigm, the other partners have seats at European Central Bank board. 
In Dollarization arena, “Coronation” criteria are essentially a mechanism to make irreversible, 
precedent economic reforms, to avoid the counter-reforms. “Nike Approach” implies adopting 
the Dollar to make the reforms more promptly, to reduce inflation, and another policies 
implemented in line with the money constraint (Equator embraces this criteria, urged by 
circumstances). But because Dollarization is not an automatic device to achieve monetary 
credibility, it does not yield automatic credibility of another policies: Nike Approach could be 
risky. Those risks increase pari passu the delay in another policies and practices. 
Eichengreen (2000) considers labor market reforms, fiscal reforms, financial sector reforms and 
more synchronization with country cycles of the country whose money is adopted: 
1) With respect to labor market, the lack of discretion in monetary policy in a Dollarized 
economy, implies theoretically an increase in unemployment variability. It appears the need 
of structural reforms as a precautionary element against exceptionally unemployment 
problems. 
2) In public finance arena, there are two arguments in favor of rapid budget balancing, caused by 
Dollarization. First, interest rates decreases, so debt services do. Second, inflation tax 
disappears, obliging government to live with its own resources. It can be positive Tanzi Effect 
if inflation cut is important and inflation fall abruptly. 
3) Financial sector, specially banking sector, should be strengthen previously to Dollarization, 
Part of the task is to diminish the need of a lender of last resort that will disappear as an 
available tool. A counter-argument, related to the timing of the reforms, is that Dollarization 
itself strengthens financial system. Money-risk disappears by definition. Money-risk 
elimination facilitates firms to finance long-term project. 
4) Optimal monetary policy is used differently in countries where unemployment and business 
cycle are uncoordinated. Lower interest rates improve cycles in the country running a 
recession, but they worsen cycles in the well performing country. Dollarization implies that 
Dollarizing country had already aligned its cycles with the US ones, to impede monetary 
policy of the latter to worse the economy of Dollarizing country. Counter-cyclical policies in 
the United States, should be counter-cyclical in the Dollarizing country too. 
No theory or evidence suggest that removing all monetary discretion, it accelerates the reform 
pace in labor market. Neither it yields an automatic harmonization in business cycles between 
countries. Nor is clear that fiscal problems disappeared with Dollarization. Only financial sector 
strengthen is almost automatic. But banking could loss exchange business in economies where 
Dollarization is official or semi-official. 
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For some authors, like Stein (1999), the disposal of a lender of last resort is not an advantage, 
because of moral hazard trouble. The implicit guarantee against illiquidity implies banks could 
take more risk than socially desirable. Moreover, the mere potential of money issuing to protect 
banks could induce savers to be less cautious, with respect of who is caring their money (Stein, 
1999). There are substitutes to a lender of last resort: Argentina, for instance, has established a 
REPO arrangement, who confer a selling option up to US$ 6700 millions, in Dollar denominated 
instruments to a group of financial institutions in case of a banking crisis. Another possibility, is 
that the United States shares with Dollarized countries part of the increasing segniorage yielding 
from the extension of legal tender of Dollar. That revenue could be used in critical situations 
(Stein, 1999).  
In theory, devaluation should lower salaries and increase exports. Nevertheless, salaries 
determination depends, in part, from monetary policy. With a high and variable inflation, labor 
agreements tend to be of shorter terms, and indexed. In those countries, a real wage cut by means 
of a devaluation is constrained (Stein, 1999). 
Currency Boards resolve time inconsistencies and could abort speculative self-feeding runs, and 
another undesired results. Credibility gains have a cost: comparing with other pegged exchange 
rate regimens, Currency Boards put higher constraints on credit policy and in authorities’ ability 
to alter the exchange rate. Some authors had argued that Currency Boards are less desirable to big 
countries, since they can alter international interest rates with an independent monetary policy. In 
general, few countries enjoy that advantage, since growing integration and less international 
financial controls. The cost of resigning the exit-option, depends on the fragility of the economy 
to aggregate shocks, and on the absence and infectivity of alternative policy instruments (Gosh, 
Gulde and Wolf, 1998). Dollarization has another additional feature: it is virtually no reversible. 
With few exceptions, countries introducing its own currencies, had done it in exceptional 
circumstances, like its independence. Noted exceptions were Slovakia, separated from Czech 
Republic, and Botswana, who when introduced its own currency (the Pula), at the first time 
issued in parity with South African Rand, turning later to a currency basket later. Complete 
Dollarization could be intended as a Currency Board without exit option. Historical experiences 
like the end of Gold Standard, and the CFA Franc recent devaluation, suggest that an exit option 
has a no negative value, especially in presence of extreme shocks. Great Depression is perhaps 
the most valuable example in XX century, of an extreme adverse shock that triggered the exit 
from a pegged exchange rates system. Argentina, for example, starts to follow an active monetary 
policy, sterilizing capital flows since 1931, after the abandonment of gold convertibility in 1929 
(Berg and Borensztein, 2000).  
The fourteen CFA Franc countries represent a recent example (1993) of devaluation after a long 
time of pegging, against severe external shocks and a poor growth performance. The regime 
resembles a Currency Board agreement, with convertible money and a pegged exchange rate with 
French Franc since 1948, through 1994. During the second half of 1980s and in the first half of 
1990s, a prolonged worsen in terms of trade, and a rising labor costs, in combination with French 
Franc appreciation against US Dollar, led to a CFA Franc appreciation, and stagnation of the 
group economies. In 1994, CFA Franc was devalued in 50%. Production, exports and 
investments improved, and were a little increase in inflation (Berg and Borensztein, 2000). 
 




Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998), compared macroeconomic performance of countries holding 
Currency Boards, against other countries with other exchange agreements. Currency Boards are 
associated to less inflation (even considering possible endogeneity of the regime choosing), and 
better growth records. Ghosh, Gulfe and Wolf (1998), found that in average, inflation under 
Currency Boards was around 4% lower than in another pegged exchange regimes. In part, that 
lower inflation was achieved by a discipline effect (lower monetary growth), and part came from 
a confidence effect (higher money demand, for any given economic growth rate). The latter 
account for 3.5 of the 4% difference. 
Volatility of inflation is lower in Currency Boards’ countries. There, economic growth had been 
faster than in countries with (generic) pegged exchange rates. They have had fiscal imbalances 
averaging 2.8% of the GDP, comparing with 4.2% in classic cases of pegged exchange rate, and 
4.4% under floating regimes. The study was based in a yearly database over all IMF members 
since1970 to 1996. There were 2386 observations, 1891 of pegged exchange rates and 115 of 
Currency Boards. The last sample was integrated by Antigua and Barbuda (1981-96), Argentina 
(1991-96), Dominica (1978-96), Djibouti (1978-96), Estonia (1992-96), Grenada (1977-96), 
Hong Kong (1983-96), Lithuania (1994-96), Saint Lucia (1980-96) and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (1980-96), excluding years when regime was changed. The sample include only as 
Currency Boards, regimens with at least 50% reserve coverage. 
Inflation averaged 5.6% per year in countries with Currency Boards, 48.3% with floating rates, 
and 19% in classic pegged cases. For the whole sample, average inflation was 27.4%. Inflation 
variability was 18.6% for the whole sample, 2.6% for Currency Boards, and 38.2% for floating 
rates ‘countries and 10.1% for the rest of pegged rates’ cases. 
Average growth annual rate of per capita GDP averaged 1.5% for the whole sample, 1.6% in 
floating rates’ countries, 3.2% in Currency Boards’ countries and 1.3% in the rest of pegged rates 
countries. 
In a more ample regression on sources of growth, including as arguments physic and human 
capital, the initial level of per capita GDP with respect to United States’, terms of trade 
variability, population growth and cataclysms indicators like wars or draughts, continues to be a 
positive difference in favor of Currency Board countries (1.8% of growth, although the effect is 
not statistically significaticant). 
Eichengreen (2000) quoting a previous work with Rose, paying attention to potential banking 
crisis between 1975-92, showed that they do not found significaticant positive coefficient for 
dummies related to floating rates. Looking to exchange rate regime, for countries whose parities 
vary less to 5% or 10% in previous years, they found a stable exchange rate implies less banking 
crisis. 
 
V-The Case of Argentina 
 
Starting XX century, Argentina was one of the 10 or 15 more richer countries of the world, and 
its per capita GDP was only 40% lower than United Kingdom’s, then the ruling country, and the 
same of Canada’s per capita GDP. Nowadays, Argentina’s per capita GDP is one half the 
Canadian. Argentine familiarity with inflation is ancient: since 1889 to 1891, price level doubled. 
Since 1943 through 2000, price level grew in a factor of 10 in the US, and of 1012 in Argentina 
(Velde and Veracierto, 2000). 
Argentina has a no-orthodox Currency Board (or Quasi-Currency Board, according to Zarazaga, 
1995), where Central Bank retained some of its functions. As part of Currency Board agreement 
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adopted in 1991, Central Bank could hold government bonds. Those holdings should be bought at 
market value, they cannot exceed 33% of backing reserves, and it cannot increase more than 10% 
each year (Velde and Veracierto, 2000). On April 1st, 1991, when Currency Board was installed, 
money base was only US$ 3000 millions, having accumulated reserves in the previous year, after 
a hyperinflation of March 1990, when they reached a critical level of a little more than a few 
hundred million Dollars. Results in inflation control were very good (from hyperinflation in 
1989-90, the country passed to controlled levels in a couple of years from pegging, and to 
deflation at the beginning of the new century), and the country improved its growth performance 
after 15 years with a per capita accumulated loss of 25%. Growth was very volatile: was seriously 
attacked by Tequila Crisis in 1995, and after that for the chained crisis of Asia, Russia and Brazil 
(1997, 1998 and 1999). Brazil’s devaluation, since that country is the more important trade 
partner of Argentina, put this country in a two-year recession. The case of Argentina, after 
Tequila, showed that Currency Boards could have scarce power to fight financial crisis, when 
they happened in modern independent states, instead of colonies. In British colonies, commercial 
baking used to be branches of international banks, with resources to face problems in colonies. Its 
matrixes in London provided lender of last resort type services. According to Zarazaga (1995), 
foreign banks in Argentina were the first in cutting credit in Tequila crisis. After the fail of an 
investment bank with high exposure in Mexican bonds, one month later Mexican devaluation, 
Argentine financial system confronted a massive run on deposits (20% of the whole deposits of 
the system), a run against domestic currency, and capital flows outside the country. More than 30 
banks go into bankruptcy or were merger into stronger entities. GDP fell severely, and 
unemployment rate grew 50%, between October 1994 and may 1995, from 12.5 to 18.6%. 
Currency Board did not protect Argentina from the speculative attack to their currency. 
Devaluation was avoided, but the cost was a severe financial crisis, and an intense recession in 
the real sector of the economy. 
Part of the fragility of the system, is the combination of backing to local currency with foreign 
exchange, with a banking system expanding credit, because of the persistence of a fractional 
reserves requirements. A run into banking, followed by other against local currency, could 
deplete reserves of the system. Although banking money are bank’s liabilities (not central bank 
liabilities) a “liquidationist” policy like 1930s’ in the US, is not feasible, and some kind of rescue 
is needed. Lesson was learned, and contingent credits obtained for the possibility of another 
crisis. Reserve bank requirements in Argentina are higher to international levels, and capital 
requirements in Argentina are known in the financial system jargon as “Basilea Plus”. The cost of 
that defense lines is a very high interest rate spread. 
Argentine experience examination, shows that legal institutions do not warrant policy stability. 
Zarazaga (1995) gave an example: in the middle of the crisis, Central Bank of Argentina was 
endowed with some more power than its legal autonomy act awarded in 1992. Other historical 
case was German Reichsbank, declared legally independent on May 26th, 1922, three months 
before the starting of German hyperinflation of 1922-23. 
Currency Board was founded in Argentina in the middle of a wave of fiscal and monetary 
reforms, massive privatization, and a Free Trade Agreement with neighbor countries. Some 
authors are skeptical with respect to the possibility of tight monetary rule in Argentina induces 
the reform in the labor market. There the reforms were limited, even when unemployment rose 
from 6% in 1991, to a figure closed to 15% nowadays, having reached a ceiling of 18% after 
Tequila crisis. Recent reforms went to a more decentralized wage negotiations, and collective 






In opportunity of Brazilian devaluation on January 1999, market turned to watch to Argentina: 
the next candidate to fall. The president of this country doubled the bet, and announced his 
preference to Dollarize instead of devaluate. He also declared be in the search of a monetary 
agreement with the United States. The move of Argentina induces a more profound discussion in 
Latin America on official Dollarization. Few time later, Equator launched its own official 
Dollarization, without an agreement with the US. 
The bigger independent Dollarized country was Panama at the time. Since 1971 (the last Bretton 
Woods exchange rate agreement) to date, only Panama, in the group of all Less Developed 
Countries had the combination of yearly inflation never more than 20%, and never had exchange 
controls (Schuler, 1999). Panama enjoyed a good GDP performance (even nothing special), an 
average inflation rate lower than of the United States, and has not experimented ample banking 
failures. Along with Puerto Rico, Panama is the unique Latin American country where private 
lenders offered 30 years mortgages at fixed interest rates. Official Dollarization functions in a 
very similar shape that a monetary system between regions of the same country: Panama has the 
same relation with New York, than Pennsylvania or Puerto Rico (Schuler, 1999). 
To United States government, net segniorage flow of issuing Dollars, is approximately US$ 25 
billions per year, less than 1.5% of federal government, or 0.3% of US GDP. Foreigners, holding 
between 55 to 70% of Dollar notes, account for a segniorage of US$ 15 billion a year. If 
Argentina is to replace its currency for the Dollar, US government will win around US$ 759 
million of yearly segniorage (1.2% of federal Argentine budget) 
Argentina pretended three objectives in the first part of 1999: 
1) Share segniorage coming from the use of Dollar in Argentina. 
2) Access of Argentine banks to the discount window of the FED. 
3) Co-operation in banking surveillance. 
Officers of US Treasury and the FED remarked that the US will not awarded access to discount 
window, neither surveillance to banks in Dollarized countries, but the United States could share 
segniorage. 
Berg and Borensztein (2000), analyzed costs and benefits of Dollarization, compared to its closer 
alternative, Currency Boards, and quantified the case of Argentina, when it was possible. 
Potential advantages included lower indebtedness costs, and a more deep integration with world 
markets. Dollarization was seen as a way to avoid monetary and balance of payments crisis. 
Without local currency, it does not exist the possibility of an abrupt depreciation, and could be 
avoided huge capital flows led by fears of devaluation.  
To conclude something about its advantages and draw backs, there are some problems: 
1) There are no historical experiences to be compared (only Panama). 
2) Dollarization is virtually irreversible. 
Currency Boards and Dollarization are very similar, but they exhibit some differences. 
Dollarization implies segniorage loss, and it seems definitive. In the Argentine case, the stock 
cost of Dollarize is the retirement of US$ 15 billion of domestic currency. The flow of new 
segniorage coming from the increasing of money demand, was around US$ 1 billion per year 
since 1993 to 1998 (or 0.35% GDP). Even in the absence of Tequila type crisis, the growth of 
money base demand is likely to decline along with technological change. For G7 countries, 
annual average increase in cash balances was 0.3% GDP in the last 10 years. 
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Velde and Veracierto (2000), tried to shed light on costs and benefits of Dollarize in Argentina. 
The economy is Dollarized to some extent: more than 60% of the deposits of private non-
financial sector are Dollar-denominated. Money reserves requirements are denominated in 
Dollarized instruments. Important transactions are negotiated in Dollars.  
It is not clear that Dollarization solved default risk. In the United States, for example, where no 
state had repudiated its debt in a century, there are differences in ratings, from grade AAA for 
Minnesota, to A for New York. When debt crisis has fundamental roots, Dollarization could not 
prevent them. But it can play an important role in preventing debt crisis originated in 
expectations. Because Dollarization impedes to collect segniorage, it can be a factor in the 
country risk reduction (there are opinions against this argument, motivated in the observation of 
compared experience of Argentina and Brazil: according them, by previous hypothesis, Brazil 
should be seen as more fragile by bond holders, although, to repay its debts has an additional 
fiscal instruments, like the possibility of expropriate domestic money holders to pay its debts). 
Absence of a lender of last resort, was fulfilled in Tequila crisis with a set of policies to provide 
liquidity to the banking system, suffering at the time a massive run. Reserves mandated to banks 
were cut, in a first stage, and they were Dollarized, and allowed to be invested in liquid 
instruments. It has been created a deposit insurance (it did not exist at the time of Tequila Crisis) 
covering each deposit up to US$ 30 thousand. Reaches 5% of the whole deposits; in the US only 
FDIC covers the fourth part of that figure. In December 1996, Argentina entered in an agreement 
with foreign banking consortia, obtaining a Repo coverage at LIBOR plus 200 BP, for around 
US$ 7.5 billion (9% of total deposits). The lender of last resort function is more or less related to 
government ability to collect taxes (including inflation tax). Coverage in Argentina is 2.4 times 
money base. Only Repo agreements provide the possibility of increase in 50% money base 
backing. 
With respect to the loss of monetary policy autonomy in case of Dollarization, the country is in 
fact so open to capital flows, and has a little discretion in isolating domestic interest rates. The 
recent changes in US interest rates (cuts in 50 bp), have little importance in relation with recent 
changes in country risk (sometimes in 1000 BP). 
The move from a Currency Board through Dollarization does not alter the ability to act as lender 
of last resort: in fact, in neither case the policy is available.  
Following Brazil devaluation on January 1999, Ecuadorian currency, the Sucre, suffered a 
speculative attack. On March 2nd it was devalued and in the same day 8 banks closed its doors. 
On March 11th, the government froze deposits in the whole banking system. The unpleasant sense 
with financial crisis and the general state of the economy induced some viewers to propose 
official Dollarization (Schuler, 1999). The performance of Central Bank of Equator has been 
poor. When it was established in 1927, exchange rate was 5 Sucre per Dollar. At the beginning of 
1999 it was 6825, at the starting of 2000 exceeded 21000, and for the end of the first week of 
2000, was between 24000 to 25000. None of the central banks in Latin America show a good 
performance in the long run, according to Instituto Ecuatoriano de Economía Política (2000). 
Equator achieved its independence, experienced economic growth, and developed a financial 
system previously to Central Bank of Equator establishing. Before Sucre creation in 1884, the 
country did not issue currency, except coins of 1 and 2 cents. In principle, Equator used Spanish 
currency, as was the practice in the whole South American countries. 
In the year 2000, more than 80% of deposits were in fact Dollar denominated. It was the currency 
in use for important transactions, like housing or cars, and services like electricity, water and fuel 
were denominated in Sucres, but indexed to Dollar. 
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The only announcing of Dollarization was enough to stabilize exchange rate, and cut inter-
banking rate from 200% to 20% (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Economía Política, 2000). In the first 
year of functioning, results are difficult to evaluate: inflation was 91%, and the economy was 
stagnated and with high unemployment rate. There were no progress in structural reforms and it 
does not seem that political consensus exist to do them. 
During 1994-95, El Salvador’s government announced its intention to establish a Currency 
Board, and then a direct transit to Dollarization. It retired the plan because of the domestic 
opposition to eliminate a national identity symbol. On January 1st, 2000, country started its 
official Dollarization. A very country specific feature is the importance of emigrated remittances 
from the US. 
In Costa Rica, the president of the Central Bank has expressed interest in official Dollarization. 
Ministry of Finance from Guatemala has indicated too its interest in Dollarize that country 
(Hernández 1999).  
Since its monetary crisis of 1994-95, prominent Mexican and foreigners had debated the 
possibility of using a Currency Board or Dollarizing in Mexico. 
In some other countries, including Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Jamaica, Peru, Russia 
and Venezuela, economists and other viewers have discussed official Dollarization, even with no 
practical effects to the time being.  
 
VII-Concluding Remarks  
 
With pegged exchange rates, the exchange risk lower with respect to linked currency, transaction 
costs fall, a nominal anchor to monetary policy is available, but there is loss discretion in a crisis 
event, and another loss in autonomy for fairly monetary policy. Credibility gains are no 
automatic. 
Currency Boards accomplish strongly with the pegged rates advantages, but its disadvantages are 
more pronounced, since the exit option is reduced. 
Dollarization has the same pros and cons attributable to pegged rates and Currency Boards, but 
magnified. Segniorage is lost, and an “intangible asset”, more or less valuable, depending on the 
country, disappears. Dollarization cold is unofficial (de facto, by currency substitution), semi-
official (including authorization to constitute deposits in foreign currency), and official (de jure). 
An interesting point in the debate is the timing of Dollarization: first reforming, then Dollarizing 
or the opposite. Coronation Approach considers previous need of reforms in labor markets, in 
fiscal policy, in financial sector and in cycle synchronization. For Nike Approach, Dollarization 
is followed by credibility, and induces reforms. European common currency process, is inspired 
in the first criteria, when more recent Latin American and Transition Economies of Currency 
Boards and Dollarization had inverted the timing (Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Equator and El Salvador). The former is related to the hope of winning credibility in bad 
reputation environments. Some of the benefits perceived in theoretical discussion, are seen in 
these countries as ballast: discretionary policy practice has been a disaster and linking to rules 
seems to be the way to monetary and fiscal discipline, and to gain impulse to make the reforms. 
Moreover, persistence of previous high inflation episodes, and instability, jeopardize a great deal 
for objective benefits of discretion: for example, it can be a general indexation scheme. 
Dollarization, in addition to Currency Board features is virtually irreversible. With little 
exceptions, countries introduced its own currency in exceptional circumstances, like 
independence achievement. 
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How is the empirical evidence? Between 1970-96, inflation averaged 5.6% yearly in Currency 
Boards countries, 48.3% in floating rate cases, and 19% in classic pegged rates cases. For the 
whole sample, average inflation was 27.4%. 
Average per capita GDP growth rate for the whole sample was 1.5%, 1.6% for floating rate 
countries, 3.2% in Currency Board countries, and 1.3% in the rest of pegged rate countries. 
Is this evidence concluding? It is probably insufficient and highly specific, but is the only 
available (cases of currency boards and Dollarization are scarce). 
Results at national level, yield particular characteristics. Argentine Currency Board experience 
shows the strength of the regime to stabilize and to induce a growth rate recovery; that reforms 
are not automatic, and the evidence also shows that the absence of labor market reform is costly 
in terms of unemployment. 
Variability of growth rate and financial fragility are other lessons to extract from national case. 
The case of Bulgaria is more recent, and results are not concluding. This country enjoys the 
advantage of its potential to integrate to European Union. Equator has only a year and a half of 
Dollarization, and El Salvador a few months. 
To conclude two observations: 
1) It is clear that Currency Boards and Dollarization could be desirable, under certain 
circumstances, for stability and growth, instead of a traditional scheme of Central Bank. 
Which are these circumstances? To constitute an optimal currency zone with the country to 
be linked and to be consistent in reforming to build reputation. The former implies openness 
in trade and finance, synchronization of economic cycles with the US, and a labor market 
capable to absorb shocks in a context of fewer instruments. But new Dollarized countries and 
recent Currency Boards seem to search more: they have poor reputation and they have to 
construct credibility: moreover, they do not have much time to do it. They have to do reforms 
where local consensus is not rounded, and then pressures to reforms are to be generated with 
“fait acompli” and hard to reverse situations. 
2) It is clear too, that Currency Boards and Dollarization are not universal panacea for instability 
problems and for weak growth records. Loosing monetary policy (and its related, exchange 
rate policy), is resigning to an instrument (a tool, is not good or bad itself, but it has a likely 
good or bad use). Therefore, if experience is of bad using of the instrument, it can led to 
resign it. Experience is diverse, even in an unstable environment like Latin America. Lastly, 
and related with the latter, problems of time inconsistency could not be solved 
instantaneously, and reforms are not automatic, although instruments resignation take place. 
In recent times, Euro has depreciated against US Dollar, and that hurt Argentine competitiveness 
in relation to Euro zone (Brazilian Real is highly correlated to Euro movements). As an epilogue, 
in May and June of 2001, some news was introduced in the Argentine Currency Board. The 
Dollar have been linked to a basket composed 50% by US Dollar and 50% by Euro. The basket 
will started to work when exchange rate between Dollar and Euro is 1 to 1. Since that moment, 
Peso will be adjusted according the movements between both currencies. For the time being, a 
commercial exchange rate was created for foreign trade that operates as if today that relation 
between Dollar and Euro were 1 to 1. In practice it seems a devaluation of 8% at the beginning of 
the operation of the “convergence factor” (the exchange rate adjustment to reach the level of the 
basket). Government pay exporters the difference of exchange rate value according the basket 
and the value of US$ 1 = Peso 1. For the remaining circumstances, exchange rate continue to be 1 





Table 1: Current Currency Boards  
Country Years in operation Backing Asset Reserve Requirements Minimum Backing 
Argentina 9 Dollar 2/3 foreign reserves and 
gold, 1/3 Dollar 
denominated government 
bonds 
100% of M0 (Monetary 
Base) 
Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines (East 
Caribbean Currency 
Authority ECCB) 
35 Dollar Foreign Currency and Gold 60% of M0 
Brunei 33 Singapore Dollar Liquid external assets, 
external securities, and its 
accrued interests 
70% of Central Bank debts 
Bosnia 3 DM 50% of Central Bank 
capital, and assets 
denominated in DM 
100% monetary liabilities 
of Central Bank 
Bulgaria 3 DM External assets and Gold M0 plus excess desired 
coverage 
Djibouti 51 Dollar External Assets 100% cash issued 
Estonia 8 DM External Assets and Gold 100% of M0 (excluding 
Central Bank certificates) 
Hong Kong 17 Dollar External Assets 105% cash issued (notes 
and coins) 
Lithuania 7 Dollar External Assets and Gold 100% of M0 + liquid 
liabilities of the Central 
Bank 
Source: Ghosh et al (1998) 
 
 
Table 2: Gross Costs of Dollarization in Selected Countries 
Country Years Minimum (GDP % per year) Maximum (GDP % per year) 
Argentina 1991-6 0,2 0,5 
Brazil 1994-6 0,1 1,3 
Equator 1991-7 0,2 7,4 
El Salvador 1991-6 0,2 2,3 
Mexico 1991-7 0,2 0,8 
Sources: Schuler (1999), Bogetic (1999), quoted by Schuler (1999), maximum. Both estimates use IMF International Financial Statistics 
information.  
Notes: Minimum is calculated as currency in cash, in the end of the year, times the average annual interest rates of commercial papers in the 
US. 
Maximum is the annual average growth rate of monetary base (calculated from line 14 of International Financial Statistics) times the annual 
average interest rate (calculated from line 64).  
Brazil figure is based on 1994-96 data, because its hyperinflation at the beginning of 1990 overvalued the costs if calculated at that time.  
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